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WHAT’S IN A NAME: THE BATTLE OVER A
UNIFORM FIDUCIARY STANDARD FOR
INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKERDEALERS
ANDREW MELNICK†
For generations, investors had clear choices when seeking
assistance in investing their money.
Investment advisers
provided financial advice, either by exercising discretionary
trading authority or providing financial planning, in exchange for
a fee, typically based on the asset value of the account. Brokerdealers provided execution services for clients who wished to
trade, occasionally made recommendations to customers on
which they could choose to act or not act, and were compensated
by commissions generated on transactions in the account.
Investment advisers were regulated by the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 and had clear fiduciary duties. Brokers under the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s (“FINRA”) regulatory
scheme did not have generalized fiduciary duties to their
customers, but when making recommendations to customers,
they had to act “fairly” and have a “reasonable basis” for making
such recommendations.
The lines have blurred considerably over the past decades as
broker-dealers expanded their offerings of products and services.
Brokers—“registered representatives” with FINRA—now carry
titles such as “Financial Adviser” or “Investment Consultant”
and may have designations such as “Certified Financial Planner”
and “Retirement Planning Specialist.” They may now also
charge a fee in a brokerage account. Broker-dealers themselves
offer an array of advisory services and programs in which
registered representatives, portfolio managers, or others within
the firm act in an advisory capacity.

†
Partner, Schindler Cohen & Hochman LLP in New York. The author would
like to thank Francesca Celestre, Esq., his colleague at Schindler Cohen & Hochman
LLP, for her invaluable insights and assistance in preparing this Article.
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Multiple studies have shown that investors, while benefiting
from having the choice of working with an investment adviser or
broker, are confused by the differences between the two and are
not familiar with the differences in the standard of care between
them.1 FINRA Rule 2111, the suitability standard for brokerdealers, requires that a FINRA member have a “reasonable
basis” to believe that a recommended transaction or strategy is
suitable for the customer based on the customer’s investment
profile.2 Some commentators posit that the suitability standard
of conduct fails to adequately protect investors.3 Advocates and
participants in securities litigations, arbitrations, and regulatory
enforcement proceedings have spent hundreds of thousands of
hours arguing over whether a particular registered
representative and his or her firm owed a fiduciary duty to a
particular client, and if so, what duties exactly were owed to the
client as a result of this status.
Congress sought to address the issue of the proper standard
of care applicable to investment advisers and broker-dealers in
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act” or “Dodd-Frank”),4 which, among
other things, required the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the “SEC”) to conduct a study to evaluate “the effectiveness of
existing legal or regulatory standards of care for brokers, dealers,
[and] investment advisers.”5 Specifically, Dodd-Frank amends
section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange
Act”) to permit the SEC to
promulgate rules to provide that, with respect to a broker or
dealer, when providing personalized investment advice about
securities to a retail customer . . . the standard of conduct for

1
See ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, INVESTOR AND
INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 112
(2008).
2
FINRA Rule 2111, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_
viewall.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859&print=1.
3
David Serchuk, Suitability: Where Brokers Fail, FORBES.COM (June 24, 2009,
6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/23/suitability-standards-fiduciary-intelli
gent-investing-brokers.html.
4
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-03, § 913(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1824–25 (2010).
5
Id.
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such broker or dealer with respect to such customer shall be the
same as the standard of conduct applicable to an investment
adviser . . . .6

On January 21, 2011, the SEC staff released its Dodd-Frankmandated Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers (the
“SEC Staff Study” or “Study”).7 In the Study, consistent with its
legislative mandate, the SEC staff recommended rulemaking to
establish a uniform fiduciary standard for investment advisers
and broker-dealers that is “no less stringent” than the fiduciary
standard applicable to investment advisers under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”).8 Specifically, the Staff
recommended that
the standard of conduct for all brokers, dealers, and investment
advisers, when providing personalized investment advice about
securities to retail customers (and such other customers as the
Commission may by rule provide), shall be to act in the best
interest of the customer without regard to the financial or other
interest of the broker, dealer, or investment adviser providing
the advice.9

The SEC Staff Study was issued in January 2011.10
Although former SEC Chairman Schapiro stated that such
rulemaking is “a priority” and there have been congressional
hearings, no rules have been issued. 11 In the interim, a general
consensus among industry participants and observers has
emerged, perhaps recognizing the inevitability of the imposition
of a uniform standard, in support of the concept of a uniform
fiduciary standard for broker-dealers and investment advisers.12
The Securities Industry Financial Markets Association
(“SIFMA”) lent its support to the concept of a uniform standard.13

6
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 913(g), 124
Stat. at 1828 (emphasis added) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(k)(1) (2012)).
7
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKERDEALERS (2011), available at www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
8
Id. at v–vi.
9
Id. at 109–10.
10
See generally id.
11
Jesse Hamilton & Margaret Collins, Tougher Dodd-Frank Fiduciary
Standard for Brokers Stalled, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 10, 2012, 10:48 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-10/tougher-dodd-frank-fiduciary-standardfor-u-s-brokers-stalled.html.
12
Id.
13
SIFMA Statement on SEC Fiduciary Duty Study, SIFMA (Jan. 22, 2011),
http://www.sifma.org/news/news.aspx?id=23128.
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A coalition of the Consumer Federation of America, AARP, and
others has also publicly stated support.14 Prominent academics
and industry observers have voiced support for such a standard,
citing concerns that “investors will be sold inappropriate
products or [be] overcharged without the rule.”15
What these broad statements of support for a uniform
standard mask are the fierce differences in the competing visions
of what precisely that uniform fiduciary standard should look
like and how it should be implemented. While the SEC staff
should be praised for their exhaustive and thoughtful analysis of
the regulatory framework of investment advisers and brokerdealers, many of the recommendations in the SEC Staff Study
are vague and need substantial clarification as part of the final
rulemaking process. As these interested industry groups and
individuals recognize, the devil is in the details.
Simply
imposing a “fiduciary” standard taken from, or based on, the
Advisers Act—effectively labeling broker-dealers as fiduciaries
under that regulatory regime—is both detrimental to the brokerdealer model and inconsistent with the SEC’s mandate under
Dodd-Frank.
The imposition of a uniform fiduciary standard covering
broker-dealers has the potential to upend decades of case law and
regulatory precedent regarding the existence of, and more
importantly, the scope of a broker-dealer’s fiduciary duty. The
SEC and FINRA have long refrained from imposing a blanket
fiduciary standard upon broker-dealers, instead following a
transaction-based approach discussed in more detail in Part I.B
below.16 Courts have recognized that a broker-dealer does not
owe fiduciary duties to its customers absent the existence of
specific circumstances, such as the exercise of discretionary
trading authority.17 Broker-dealers have developed sophisticated
supervisory and compliance regimes designed to help brokers

14
See Letter from the Consumer Fed’n of Am. et al. to Mary L. Schapiro,
Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Mar. 28, 2012) [hereinafter CFA Letter],
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/SIFMA-FrameworkResponse3-29-12.pdf.
15
Hamilton & Collins, supra note 11.
16
See infra Part I.B.
17
See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Economic Suicide: The Collision of Ethics
and Risk in Securities Law, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 483, 484 (2003).
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meet their suitability obligations and protect investors.18
Registered representatives have been trained and tested, for
example through the Series 7 licensing exam, on their suitability
obligations.19 The SEC’s final rules need to be clear and precise
and need to provide ample illustrative guidance on the contours
of any uniform fiduciary standard that will be applied to brokerdealers. In short, being labeled a “fiduciary” subject to a uniform
fiduciary standard of care is just the start of the process.
This Article briefly traces the content and sources of the
standards governing the conduct of investment advisers and
broker-dealers. This Article then summarizes the key elements
and recommendations of Dodd-Frank and the SEC Staff Study,
and describes the competing visions offered by SIFMA and the
Consumer Federation of America coalition in their respective
letters to the SEC.
This Article concludes with a few
observations about particular areas—specifically on the meaning
of “personalized investment advice” and the provision of ongoing
advice and the duty to monitor—that the SEC should consider
providing detailed guidance on. Depending on the final rules
formulated by the SEC, the imposition of a uniform fiduciary
standard applicable to broker-dealers can represent a sea change
in how broker-dealers conduct their business, requiring an
overhaul of the current model and a massive investment in
technology, personnel, and training; or it can represent an
incremental change, one that enhances investor protection and
reduces investor confusion while allowing the broker-dealer
model to continue to offer investors a wide array of choices of
services and products at a range of pricing options.

18
See Graham Ravdin, Note, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Arguing for a
Transatlantic Investor Protection Regime, 50 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 490, 498
(2012).
19
See Barbara Black, Transforming Rhetoric into Reality: A Federal Remedy for
Negligent Brokerage Advice, 8 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 101, 111–12 (2006);
Abraham J.B. Cable, Fending for Themselves: Why Securities Regulations Should
Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 107, 137 (2010).
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STANDARDS OF CONDUCT APPLICABLE TO INVESTMENT
ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS

Registered Investment Advisers: The Fiduciary Standard

Under the Advisers Act section 202(a)(11), an investment
adviser is:
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of
advising others, either directly or through publications or
writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for
compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities.20

The SEC staff has generally concluded that a person is an
investment adviser if that person: (i) provides advice, or issues
reports or analyses, regarding securities; (ii) is in the business of
providing such services; and (iii) receives compensation for such
services.21 “Many money managers, investment consultants, and
financial planners are regulated as ‘investment advisers’ under
the Advisers Act or similar state statutes.”22 Excluded from the
definition of “investment adviser” under the Act are brokerdealers (i) whose performance of investment advisory services is
“solely incidental” to the conduct of its business as a brokerdealer and (ii) who receive no “special compensation” for their
advisory services.23
Under the Advisers Act, investment advisers are fiduciaries
to their clients.24 An investment adviser is duty-bound to serve
the best interests of its clients, including an obligation to act
solely in the client’s best interests and thus subordinate its own
interests to those of its clients.25 This duty of loyalty requires an
investment adviser that has a material conflict of interest to

20

Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C § 80b-2(a)(11) (2012).
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 15; see Applicability of the
Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, Pension Consultants, and Other
Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory Services as a Component of Other
Financial Services, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1092, 39 SEC Docket 494,
1987 WL 112702, at *3 (Oct. 8, 1987).
22
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 15.
23
See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b2(a)(11)(C).
24
See id. § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6; SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,
375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963).
25
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 22.
21
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either eliminate that conflict or fully disclose to the customer all
material facts relating to the conflict and obtain his or her
written consent.26 With respect to compensation, investment
advisers typically charge an asset-based fee, thereby avoiding the
incentive to execute trades that might not be in the client’s best
interest.27 Further to this duty to eliminate or disclose material
conflicts of interest, the Advisers Act explicitly prohibits an
adviser, when acting as a principal for its own account, from
effecting any sale or purchase of any security for the account of a
client without first disclosing certain information to the client in
writing and obtaining the client’s consent.28
The duty of care ascribed to an investment adviser requires
it to “make a reasonable investigation to determine that it is not
basing its recommendations on materially inaccurate or
incomplete information.”29 The Advisers Act demonstrates “a
congressional intent to eliminate, or at least to expose, all
conflicts of interest which might incline as [sic] investment
adviser—consciously or unconsciously—to render advice which
was not disinterested.”30 Thus, in practice, “the Advisers Act
establishes a statutory fiduciary duty for investment advisers to
act for the benefit of their clients, requiring advisers to exercise
the utmost good faith in dealing with clients, to disclose all
material facts, and to employ reasonable care to avoid misleading
clients.”31
B.

Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Standard

A “broker” is defined by the Exchange Act as “any person
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for
the account of others.”32 A “dealer” is similarly defined as “any
person engaged in the business of buying and selling
securities . . . for such person’s own account through a broker or

26

Id. at 22, 26.
See id. at 41–42.
28
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3); U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 25.
29
Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 3052, 98 SEC Docket 3027, 2010 WL 2779423, at *52 (July 14, 2010); U.S. SEC.
& EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 22.
30
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–92 (1963).
31
SEC v. Moran, 922 F. Supp. 867, 895–96 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
32
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(4)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (2012).
27
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otherwise.”33 Broker-dealers must generally register with the
SEC and are required to become members of at least one selfregulatory organization (“SRO”), such as FINRA.34
Unless
broker-dealers charge separately for their advice, they are
excluded from the definition of “investment adviser” and are not
subjected to a fiduciary standard.35 Broker-dealers traditionally
receive transaction-based compensation, for example, in the form
of commissions.36
Pursuant to the antifraud provisions of the securities laws
and SRO rules—including FINRA Rule 2010, which relates to the
“just and equitable principles of trade”—broker-dealers are
required to deal fairly with customers.37 However, the federal
securities laws, SEC rules, and SRO regulations do not impose a
blanket fiduciary duty upon broker-dealers in dealing with their
customers.38 Rather, courts have generally held that brokerdealers, absent the exercise of discretionary trading authority or
control over customer assets—the hallmark of a nondiscretionary account—or the existence of a relationship of trust
and confidence with a customer, do not owe customers a fiduciary
duty.39 Thus, in the typical non-discretionary brokerage account,
absent special factors and circumstances, a broker-dealer does
not owe its customer a fiduciary duty.40 Rather, the duty is

33

Id. § 3(a)(5)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)(A).
Id. § 15(a)(1), (b)(11)(a)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1), (b)(11)(a)(i); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15b9-1 (2013).
35
See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80b2(a)(11)(c) (2012); Nicholas S. Di Lorenzo, Note, Defining a New Punctilio of an
Honor: The Best Interest Standard for Broker-Dealers, 92 B.U. L. REV. 291, 299 n.44
(2012).
36
See Cable, supra note 19, at 139.
37
FINRA Rule 2010, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_
content.html?rbid=2403&element_id=5504; see Steven A. Ramirez, The Professional
Obligations of Securities Brokers Under Federal Law: An Antidote for Bubbles?, 70
U. CIN. L. REV. 527, 540–41, 546–47 (2002).
38
See Di Lorenzo, supra note 35, at 305 (discussing the Merrill Lynch Rule
which was designed “to exempt broker-dealers from fiduciary duties”).
39
See De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1308–09 (2d Cir.
2002); Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1220, 1231
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Although the existence of fiduciary relationships under New York
law cannot be determined by recourse to rigid formulas, New York courts typically
focus on whether one person has reposed trust or confidence in another who thereby
gains a resulting superiority or influence over the first.”), rev’d, 967 F.2d 742 (2d Cir.
1992).
40
See Bissell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 937 F. Supp. 237, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),
aff’d, 157 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Caravan Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v.
34
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limited to the specific matter entrusted to the broker-dealer—
namely, the “narrow task of consummating the transaction
requested.”41
Moreover, it is well-settled that a broker ordinarily does not
have a duty to give ongoing advice in between transactions in a
non-discretionary account, even if the broker had volunteered
such advice on previous occasions.42 As the Second Circuit held
in De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co.:
It is uncontested that a broker ordinarily has no duty to
monitor a nondiscretionary account, or to give advice to such a
customer on an ongoing basis. The broker’s duties ordinarily
end after each transaction is done, and thus do not include a
duty to offer unsolicited information, advice, or warnings
concerning the customer’s investments. A nondiscretionary
customer by definition keeps control over the account and has
full responsibility for trading decisions. On a transaction-bytransaction basis, the broker owes duties of diligence and
competence in executing the client’s trade orders, and is obliged
to give honest and complete information when recommending a
purchase or sale. The client may enjoy the broker’s advice and
recommendations with respect to a given trade, but has no legal
claim on the broker’s ongoing attention.43

Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 769 F.2d 561, 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding no
continuing fiduciary relationship existed where the customer had a nondiscretionary account with broker); Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 952–53 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (finding that broker owed only
limited, transactional duties to customer who maintained non-discretionary
account), aff’d, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981).
41
Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1999).
42
See De Kwiatkowski, 306 F.3d at 1302.
43
Id.; see also BNP Paribas Mortg. Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 866 F. Supp. 2d
257, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“A broker or dealer that lacks discretionary control over
investment decision usually has no duty of care that extends beyond the execution of
transactions.”); DeBlasio v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 07 Civ. 318(RJS), 2009 WL
2242605, at *32 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2009) (“[T]he Court agrees with Plaintiffs that
cases such as Kwiatkowski do not demonstrate as a matter of law that every
brokerage relationship lacks fiduciary characteristics, Plaintiffs have not alleged
facts or circumstances that, if proven, would establish that the Brokerage
Defendants breached the limited duties that they owed to Plaintiffs in regard to
their brokerage accounts.”); Welch v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 07 Civ.
6904(RJS), 2009 WL 2356131, at *43 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2009) (“Brokerage
Defendants were not required to notify Plaintiffs of opportunities to improve their
earnings on uninvested funds.”); Robinson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 337 F. Supp. 107, 113 (N.D. Ala. 1971) (“[A]bsent an express investment
advisory contract there is no fiduciary duty [to monitor] unless the customer is
infirm or ignorant of business affairs.”), aff’d, 453 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1972).
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But broker-dealers remain subject to a suitability obligation,
which
generally
requires
a
broker-dealer
to
make
recommendations that the broker reasonably believes are
suitable for the client.44 Thus, new FINRA Rule 2111 requires
that a broker-dealer and registered representative “have a
reasonable basis to believe that a recommended transaction or
investment strategy involving a security or securities is suitable
for the customer, based on the information obtained through the
reasonable diligence of the member or associated person to
ascertain the customer’s investment profile.”45 As described in
FINRA’s guidance in connection with issuance of the new
suitability rule, there are three main obligations comprising a
broker-dealer’s
suitability
obligation:
(i) reasonable-basis
suitability; (ii) customer-specific suitability; and (iii) quantitative
suitability.46 For reasonable-basis suitability, the broker-dealer
must have a reasonable basis, based on reasonable diligence, to
believe that the recommendation is suitable for at least some
investors.47 FINRA guidance makes clear that the scope and
breadth of “reasonable diligence” is dependent upon the
complexity and risks associated with the security or strategy and
the member firm’s familiarity with the security or investment
strategy.48 The customer-specific obligation requires that the
member firm have a reasonable basis to believe that the
recommendation is suitable for the particular customer based on
the customer-specific information obtained by the member firm.49
The third component, quantitative suitability, evaluates whether
a broker-dealer who has actual or de facto control over a
customer account has a reasonable basis for believing that a
series of recommendations is suitable and not excessive in light
of the customer’s investment profile.50

44
See FINRA, Regulatory Notice 11-25: Know Your Customer and Suitablity 2
(2011), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/
documents/notices/p123701.pdf; FINRA Rule 2111, available at http://finra.
complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859
(replacing NASD Rule 2230 with FINRA Rule 2111).
45
FINRA Rule 2111.
46
See id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
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A broker-dealer’s suitability obligation is largely transactionbased and is keyed to a recommendation.51
Absent a
recommendation, under the FINRA rules, a broker-dealer has no
suitability obligation.52 There is no ongoing duty to monitor the
account or provide advice between transactions.53 This principle
was affirmed in De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co. and more
recent cases.54
II. THE SEC’S STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS
AND BROKER-DEALERS
The SEC Staff Study starts from the premise that retail
investors are often confused about the roles played by investment
advisers and broker-dealers and are not familiar with the
standard of care that applies to their dealings with them.55 At
the same time, investors wanted to preserve their investment
choices and maintain access to the fee structures and services
offered by both investment advisers and broker-dealers.56
The SEC Staff Study, after an exhaustive discussion of the
regulatory framework applicable to broker-dealers and
investment advisers, recommends that the SEC establish a
uniform fiduciary standard for broker-dealers and investment
advisers when providing personalized investment advice about
securities to retail customers; this standard should be “no less
stringent” than currently applied under sections 206(1) and (2) of
the Advisers Act,57 which require an adviser to eliminate, or at
least disclose, all material conflicts of interest.58
More
specifically, the SEC Staff Study recommends adopting a uniform
fiduciary standard that requires investment advisers and brokerdealers, when providing such personalized investment advice
about securities to retail customers, to “act in the best interest of

51

See id.
See id.; see also BNP Paribas Mortg. Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 866 F. Supp.
2d 257, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
53
See De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1302 (2d Cir.
2002).
54
See id.; see also In re Merrill Lynch Auction Rate Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d
375, 387–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Anschutz Corp. v. Merril Lynch & Co.,
690 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2012).
55
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 101.
56
See id.
57
Id. at v–vi.
58
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2012).
52
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the customer without regard to the financial or other interest of
the broker, dealer, or investment adviser providing the advice.”59
The SEC Staff Study further recommends that the SEC consider
harmonizing laws and regulations to provide protection to retail
investors who receive the same or substantially similar services
from investments advisers and broker-dealers.60
The broad outline of the proposed uniform fiduciary standard
set out by the SEC staff contains a duty of loyalty and a duty of
care.61 The SEC Staff Study notes that the duty of loyalty under
the Advisers Act prohibits an adviser from putting its own
interests ahead of its clients’ and requires broker-dealers to
disclose or eliminate material conflicts of interest.62 However,
consistent with section 913 of Dodd-Frank, the SEC Staff Study
explains that the receipt of commissions or other transactionbased compensation for the sale of securities does not, in and of
itself, necessarily violate the duty of loyalty component of the
proposed uniform fiduciary standard.63
The Staff recommended that the SEC promulgate rules to
facilitate “uniform, simple and clear disclosures to retail
[investors] about the terms of their relationships with brokerdealers and investment advisers.”64 These disclosures would be
similar to the Form ADV that investment advisers are required
to provide at the outset of the relationship and would include
more specific disclosures at the time that personalized
investment advice is provided.65
Under the Staff’s proposal, a broker or adviser would be held
to minimum standards of review and analysis when providing
personalized investment advice to retail investors.66 The Staff

59

U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 109. The study explicitly rejects
two other approaches that section 913 of Dodd-Frank required the SEC to consider:
eliminating the broker-dealer exclusion from the definition of “investment adviser”
under the Advisers Act and applying the duty of care and other requirements of the
Advisers Act to broker-dealers. Id. at 139–40.
60
See id. at 129.
61
See id. at 112, 120.
62
Id. at 112–13; Amendments to Form ADV, Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 3060, 98 SEC Docket 3502, 2010 WL 2957506, at *2 (Aug. 12, 2010).
63
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 113; see Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913(g), 124 Stat. 1376,
1828–29 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C § 80b-11(g) (2012)).
64
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 117.
65
Id.
66
See id. at 122.
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recognized the need for sufficient flexibility to cover a large and
dynamic marketplace.67 As the Staff noted, “Minimum baseline
professionalism standards could include, for example, specifying
what basis a broker-dealer or investment adviser should have in
making a recommendation to a retail customer.”68
The SEC Staff Study also recommends that the SEC adopt
guidance to define what it means to provide “personalized
investment advice.”69 At a minimum, the Study recommends
that the definition should encompass the making of a
“recommendation” as that concept has developed under
applicable broker-dealer regulation70 and should not include
“impersonal investment advice” as defined under the Advisers
Act.71
The SEC Staff Study recognizes that whether a
recommendation has been made is an intensely fact-specific
inquiry, generally dependent upon the content, context, and
presentation of a particular set of communications.72 Generally,
an important consideration is whether the communication—
given its content, context, and manner of presentation—
reasonably would be viewed as a “call to action” or a suggestion
that the customer engage in a particular transaction.73 The SEC
Staff Study provided the following as a non-exhaustive list of
communications
generally
viewed
as
constituting
a
recommendation: (1) customer-specific communications to a
targeted customer or group of customers encouraging a
transaction in a particular security or a particular strategy;
(2) communications stating that customers should invest in a
particular sector and providing a “recommended” list or “buy” list
of stocks; (3) portfolio analysis tools that generate a specific list

67

Id. at 123.
Id.
69
Id. at 127.
70
Id.; FINRA Rule 2111, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/
display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859.
71
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 127.
72
Id. at 124; NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, INC., NOTICE TO MEMBERS 01-23,
ONLINE SUITABILITY: SUITABILITY RULE AND ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS 2 (2001),
available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/
notices/p003887.pdf.
73
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 124.
68
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of “buy” or “sell” recommendations based on customer-specific
information; (4) securities that are bought, sold, or traded in a
discretionary account.74
Similarly, the SEC Staff Study lists certain activities that
fall outside the definition of a “recommendation”:
General financial and investment information such as (i) basic
investment concepts, such as risk and return, diversification,
dollar cost averaging, compounded return, and tax deferred
investment, (ii) historic differences in the return of asset
classes . . . (iii) effects of inflation, (iv) estimates of future
retirement income needs, and (v) assessment of a customer’s
investment profile;75
Descriptive
information
about
an
employer-sponsored
retirement or benefit plan . . . and the investment options
[thereunder];76
Asset allocation models that: (i) are based on generally accepted
investment theory; (ii) be accompanied by disclosures of all
material facts and assumptions that may affect a reasonable
investor’s assessment of the . . . model . . . and (iii) comply with
applicable FINRA interpretive material allowing investment
analysis tools.77

While the SEC has been drafting a rule for nearly two years,
no action on the measure is currently scheduled.78 The SEC has
held conferences and met with various interested parties
regarding the proposed changes, and Congressional hearings
have discussed the uniform fiduciary duty.79 The SEC plans to
put out a request for public comments on the potential costs of
implementing a uniform fiduciary standard,80 after which the

74

Id.
Id. at 125; see also NASD Rule IM-2210-6, available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=362
3 (superseded by FINRA Rule 2214, available at http://finra.complinet.com/
en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=10651).
76
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 125.
77
Id.
78
Hamilton & Collins, supra note 11.
79
See Joshua Horn, Broker-Dealers May End Up with ‘Hybrid’ Fiduciary
Standard, THOMSON REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2011), http://newsandinsight.thomson
reuters.com/Securities/Insight/2011/09_-_September/Broker-dealers_may_end_up_wi
th_%E2%80%98hybrid%E2%80%99_fiduciary_standard/.
80
Hamilton & Collins, supra note 11.
75
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SEC would issue a proposal, again seeking public comment.81 It
is estimated that even if this process begins today, the process
could continue into 2013.82
III. THE POSITIONS OF INTERESTED INDUSTRY GROUPS
A.

SIFMA’s Position

SIFMA submitted a letter dated July 14, 2011 (the “SIFMA
Letter”) to the SEC stating its support for the development of a
uniform fiduciary standard of conduct for broker-dealers and
investment advisers, when providing personalized investment
advice to retail customers, and offering a proposed framework
and principles for rulemaking under section 213.83 While SIFMA
supports the development of a uniform fiduciary standard, it
opposes efforts by the SEC to simply impose on broker-dealers
the fiduciary obligations of investment advisers under the
Advisers Act and related case law and regulations.84 SIFMA
asserts that the broker-dealer business model, with its broad
array of product and service offerings, is fundamentally different
than the investment adviser model and that the “general
fiduciary duty implied under section 206 of the Advisers Act, as
developed through case law, guidance and other legal
precedent, . . . provides incompatible and insufficient guidance
for broker-dealers on how to manage, disclose, or obtain consents
to these conflicts.”85
The SIFMA Letter explains how an extension of the case
law, guidance, and other precedent under the Advisers Act would
lead to undesired effects for both broker-dealers and investors.
In particular, SIFMA explains that it would adversely impact
choice, product access, and affordability of customer services.86 It
would also upend the existing supervisory and compliance regime
of broker-dealers, thereby requiring massive investments in

81

Id.
Id.
83
Letter from Ira D. Hammerman, Senior Managing Dir. & Gen. Counsel,
SIFMA, to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1–2 (July 14, 2011)
[hereinafter SIFMA Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/46062952.pdf.
84
Id. at 4.
85
Id. at 5.
86
Id. at 14.
82
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supervisory protocols, technology, and training that would make
the proposal incompatible with the “business model neutral”
approach espoused by the SEC in the Study.
The SIFMA Letter further outlines a proposed framework
and principles for the SEC to consider in promulgating rules
establishing a uniform standard.87 As formulated by SIFMA, the
uniform standard would begin with the core principle mandated
by Dodd Frank—that all broker-dealers and investment advisers,
when providing personalized advice about securities to
customers, shall “act in the best interest of the customer without
regard to the financial or other interest of the broker, dealer, or
investment adviser providing the advice.”88 From there, SIFMA
seeks a clear and detailed articulation of the scope of a brokerdealer fiduciary obligation under a uniform standard.89 For
example, SIFMA suggests that the standard of conduct should
commence when the customer agreement is signed and should
not apply to discussions about the “nature of the relationship.”90
Broker-dealers should also be permitted to shape the standard of
conduct in the customer agreement and have the standard
applied on an account-by-account basis.91 SIFMA also seeks
explicit rulemaking that traditional forms of broker-dealer
products, sales, or compensation arrangements—including
commissions, revenue sharing, distribution fees on mutual
funds—are not violative of the uniform standard of conduct.92
SIFMA seeks clear guidance from the rulemaking process that
such language does require broker-dealers to run a completely
conflict-free
business93—specifically,
language
permitting
transaction-based compensation.94

87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Id. at 15.
Id. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 16.
Id.
See id. at 16–17.
Id. at 17.
See id. at 18.
See id. at 17.
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In a similar vein, SIFMA seeks clear guidance from the SEC
on what business conduct constitutes personalized investment
advice about securities.95
SIFMA’s suggested governing
principles are drawn largely from the Study’s analysis of what
constitutes “personalized investment advice.”96
Finally, SIFMA proposes that the SEC provide clear
guidance on what disclosures would satisfy the uniform fiduciary
standard of conduct.97
B.

The Consumer Federation of America (“CFA”) Letter

On March 28, 2012, a coalition of organizations and groups—
the Consumer Federation of America, the Fund Democracy,
AARP, the Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc.,
Financial Planning Association, Investment Adviser Association,
and National Association of Personal Financial Advisors—issued
a letter (the “CFA Letter”) strongly supporting the extension of
the fiduciary duty under the Advisers Act to all broker-dealers
when they offer personalized investment advice, and responding
to the framework proposed by SIFMA.98
In contrast to the SIFMA Letter, the CFA Letter advocates
that the new uniform fiduciary standard should extend the
existing Advisers Act standard, which currently applies to
investment advisers, to broker-dealers while “clarifying its
applicability in the context of broker-dealer conduct.”99 The CFA
Letter suggests that the imposition of a uniform fiduciary
standard on broker-dealers would not have the “catastrophic
consequences” envisioned by SIFMA.100 In particular, the CFA
Letter concedes that Dodd-Frank permits broker-dealers to
charge commissions, offer transaction-based recommendations,
and sell proprietary products without any of these activities
being violative of the fiduciary duty.101

95

Id. at 18.
See id.
97
Id. at 20.
98
CFA Letter, supra note 14, at 1–2.
99
Id. at 2.
100
Id. at 1–2.
101
Id. at 3; see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913(g), 124 Stat. 1376, 1828 (2010) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78o(k) (2012)).
96
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Moreover, the CFA Letter agrees that “the fiduciary duty
should permit advice regarding a discrete transaction without
necessarily triggering a continuing duty of care.”102 However, the
CFA Letter opposes SIFMA’s proposal that a “continuing duty of
care” be exclusively addressed by the written customer
agreement.103 The CFA Letter further notes that while section
913 allows for significant changes to current broker-dealer duties
in the provision of investment advice,104 the section rejects the
imposition of an ongoing fiduciary duty, stating, “Nothing in this
section shall require a broker or dealer or registered
representative to have a continuing duty of care or loyalty to the
customer after providing personalized investment advice about
securities.”105 The CFA Letter posits that whether a continuing
duty of care exists should be determined by the facts and
circumstances of the particular broker-dealer’s relationship with
the customer, and not the customer agreement.106
Finally, while the CFA agrees with SIFMA that the SEC
needs to define “personalized investment advice,”107 it advocates
for a more general principles-based approach rather than a
specific list of examples of conduct that would or would not
constitute “personalized investment advice.”108 The CFA Letter
agrees with SIFMA’s list of four items that should be included
within “personalized investment advice” and would also include
advice on a decision to not purchase or sell a security on the
list.109 With respect to SIFMA’s fifteen items that should not be
considered “personalized investment advice,”110 the CFA Letter
agrees with some points on the list and disagrees with others.111

102

CFA Letter, supra note 14, at 8.
Id.
104
See id.
105
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 913(g), 124
Stat. at 1828.
106
CFA Letter, supra note 14, at 9.
107
Id. at 1.
108
Id. at 11.
109
Id.
110
SIFMA Letter, supra note 83, at 19–20.
111
CFA Letter, supra note 14, at 12–14.
103
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IV. THE CHALLENGES AHEAD
It appears likely that, absent a change in the administration,
the SEC will be promulgating rules announcing a uniform
fiduciary standard covering broker-dealers and investment
advisers.112 The SEC’s challenge under Dodd-Frank is to shape
the rules in such a way as to provide for enhanced investor
protection and education, while not causing wholesale changes in
the existing broker-dealer model or exposing broker-dealers to
substantial litigation and regulatory exposure.113
There are several areas in particular where the SEC would
do well to provide clear and explicit guidance. First, the SEC’s
rules should include an express acknowledgment that the receipt
of a commission does not create a violation of the proposed
fiduciary standard in and of itself.114 While Dodd-Frank provides
for this,115 clarification in the SEC’s rules would be highly
beneficial. And then, perhaps the SEC can go a step further and,
as guidance, make clear that, while compensation can be a factor
in determining whether a broker-dealer acted in the best interest
of its clients, it cannot and should not be the sole determinative
factor. Without such clarification, in the litigation, arbitration,
and regulatory enforcement process, broker-dealers and
associated persons might be vulnerable to arguments that the
“best interests” of their client were not served by putting the
client in a particular product, account, or strategy when there
was a lower-cost alternative available.116 Given the wide range of
securities and products, firms and registered representatives

112
Two of the five SEC commissioners dissented from the SEC Staff Study,
citing an insufficient analytical or empirical basis for the recommendations made in
the study. Kathleen L. Casey & Troy A. Paredes, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement
by SEC Commissioners: Statement Regarding Study on Investment Advisers and
Broker-Dealers (Jan. 21, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/
spch012211klctap.htm.
113
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Remarks, The 2011 Diane Sanger Memorial Lecture,
Protecting Investors in Securitization Transactions: Does Dodd-Frank Help, or Hurt?,
72 LA. L. REV. 591, 597 (2012).
114
SIFMA Letter, supra note 83, at 9 n.16.
115
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 913(g), 124 Stat. 1376, 1828 (2010) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78o(k) (2012)).
116
Cf. Davantzis v. PaineWebber Inc., No. 20032/2000, 2001 WL 1423519, at
*1–2 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cnty. July 21, 2001) (dismissing breach of fiduciary duty
claim alleging that defendant broker-dealer failed to put plaintiff in least expensive
account structure).
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should be allowed sufficient flexibility to recommend products
and services based on multiple factors including, but not limited
to, cost to the investor.
Perhaps more importantly, the SEC would be wise to provide
precise rules and guidance establishing that there is no ongoing
duty to provide advice between transactions unless specifically
agreed to.117 While section 913 of Dodd-Frank does not “require a
broker or dealer or registered representative to have a continuing
duty of care or loyalty to the customer after providing
personalized investment advice about securities,”118 the SEC
should make clear that the final rules do not include or imply
such a duty. Generally, a broker in a nondiscretionary account
does not have a fiduciary duty to its client119 and, more
specifically, does not have a duty to monitor the client’s accounts
between transactions.120 That fundamental principle lies at the
heart of the broker-dealer model and the relationship between
client and registered representatives.121 The suitability rule that
governs broker-dealers’ conduct with their customers has
traditionally been transaction-based.122 The new suitability rules
that recently became effective expand the concept by discussing
suitability in terms of specific recommended trades and

117
Under New York law, a party to a contract—whether a fiduciary or
otherwise—cannot be held liable for failing to perform duties beyond the scope of
those required in the governing contract. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v.
Remington Prods., Inc., 865 F. Supp. 194, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (granting summary
judgment and rejecting breach of fiduciary duty claim where such claim was based
on duties beyond the scope of relevant contract), aff’d, 71 F.3d 407 (2d Cir. 1995); see
also BNY Capital Mkts., Inc. v. Moltech Corp., No. 99 Civ. 11754(GEL), 2001 WL
262675, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2001) (stating that a fiduciary is only responsible
for “matters within the scope of the relation”); Sonet v. Timber Co., L.P., 722 A.2d
319, 323 (Del. Ch. 1998) (dismissing breach of fiduciary duty claim where limited
partnership agreement, not common law fiduciary principles, outlined governance
process over setting and approving terms of transactions). The SEC should provide
firms with the flexibility to clarify the scope of the customer agreement.
118
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 913(g), 124
Stat. at 1828.
119
See Unreported Cases, O’Malley v. Boris, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1189, 1189
(1999).
120
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
121
See Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment
Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 719 (2010).
122
See Steven D. Irwin et al., Wasn’t My Broker Always Looking Out for My Best
Interests? The Road To Become a Fiduciary, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 41, 4344 (2009).
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recommended strategies, as well as recommendations to hold a
security;123 but, essentially, suitability remains a transactionbased inquiry.124
Currently, however, broker-dealers are simply not equipped
to provide ongoing monitoring of their customers’ accounts and
positions between specific trades.125
Indeed, a particular
registered representative might have hundreds of accounts with
hundreds of positions, some recommended, some unsolicited, and
some transferred to the broker-dealer from other firms.126
Imposing an ongoing duty of care and loyalty between
transactions would require a wholesale change to broker-dealers’
technology and systems, from client intake and “know your
customer” to portfolio monitoring and reporting systems. It also
would fundamentally alter the relationship between registered
representative and broker-dealer and customer and potentially
lead to substantially increased exposure for broker-dealers in the
litigation, arbitration, and regulatory contexts.
CONCLUSION
In light of the SEC Staff Study and the various positions
espoused by industry organizations and academics, it appears
likely that a uniform fiduciary standard applicable to brokerdealers and investment advisers will be announced and
implemented in the future. The impact on broker-dealers will
depend on the details of the actual rules. If there is a wholesale
grafting of the Advisers Act’s fiduciary regime onto the rules
governing broker-dealers, the uniform fiduciary standard will
likely have a significant impact on how broker-dealers structure
their relationships with their customers and on their potential
legal exposure. If the rules are sufficiently flexible to account for
the broker-dealer business model, the standard will enhance
investor protection and education and reduce investor confusion,
while maintaining the products and services investors currently
enjoy from broker-dealers.
123
See FINRA, Regulatory Notice 11-25: Know Your Customer and Suitablity 2
(2011), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/
documents/notices/p123701.pdf.
124
See id. at 2.
125
See Gary A. Varnavides, Note, The Flawed State of Broker-Dealer Regulation
and the Case for an Authentic Federal Fiduciary Standard for Broker-Dealers, 16
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 203, 203 (2011).
126
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 8–11.

